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ERDOS V. UNITED STATES: EXPANSION OF
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND REVIVAL OF
EXTERRITORIALITY
Gary Igal Strausberg*
The following comment discusses the opinion rendered by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, per Judge
Oren R. Lewis, in the case of United States v. Erdos** in which the
defendant, the United States charg. d' affaires to the Republic of Equa-
torial Guinea, killed a fellow employee on the United States embassy
premises in that country. The case turned primarily on whether the
federal courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed within United
States embassies abroad. The district court asserted jurisdiction and a
jury verdict of voluntary manslaughter was returned against the defen-
dant.
Since this comment was written, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
has affirmed both the assertion of jurisdiction and the defendant's con-
viction. After making a preliminary determination that the federal
courts can exercise only the jurisdiction specifically conferred on them
by Congress, the circuit court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1112 conferred
subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts with respect to man-
slaughter committed "within the special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States." The much more difficult question, how-
ever, was whether U.S. embassies abroad are within this special terri-
torial jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 7 includes in the term "special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States":
(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States,
and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof or anyplace
purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of
the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection
of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.
The defendant contended that section 7 was intended to apply only to
areas within the geographical boundaries of the United States and could
not be given exterritorial effect. The circuit court admitted that section
7 was vague on this point and said the section's legislative history was
*A.B. Brooklyn College, J.D. National Law Center, George Washington University; Member
District of Columbia Bar.
**United States v. Erdos, No. 72-1328 (4th Cir., decided Feb. 14, 1973).
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too unclear to provide any help in construction. The circuit court then
undertook to construe section 7, limiting its inquiry to the terms of the
statute itself
The circuit court felt that the first two phrases of section 7(3) were
broad enough to permit exterritorial assertion of jurisdiction over U.S.
embassies abroad, but it was troubled by the more narrowly written
language of phrase three which necessarily limited jurisdiction to areas
within the geographical boundaries of the United States. The court dis-
posed of this problem, however, by pointing out that phrase three was
separated from the first two phrases by the disjunctive "or"; hence the
first two phrases stand independently of the third and are not limited
or modified by it. In response to the defendant's contention that any
statute which would confer criminal jurisdiction should be strictly con-
strued, the court said that it perceived no duty to construe a statute
narrowly where the congressional power was clear and the language of
its exercise was broad.
The circuit court further held that it makes no difference whether the
United States owns its embassy absolutely in fee simple or owns some
lesser interest. In the instant case the United States leased the embassy
premises from a private citizen of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.
To buttress this conclusion, the circuit court cited the thirty year-old
district court opinion of United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708, 709
(1943), which involved a false declaration before the American consul
in Mexico City. There the court said.
A consulate is, ordinarily, a building owned by the Government of the
United States. And although it be not owned by the United States, it
is a part of the territory of the United States of America.
The Archer case was governed, however, by a statute which in its own
terms expressly conferred federal jurisdiction over embassies, consu-
lates, and legations for the offense involved. Both the district and circuit
courts which passed on the question in Erdos, however, took, it upon
themselves to read into the proffered jurisdictional statute a congres-
sional intent that was hardly manifest in the language of the statute
itself Whether the courts have exceeded the bounds of statutory con-
struction and have indulged in an exercise of judicial law-making is a
question which would be best resolved by the Supreme Court. The
defendant has filed a petition for certiorari.
The author's scrutinizing appraisal of the District Court's opinion
points out the major issues to be considered in relation to this petition.
Defendant Erdos, the American charg d'affaires to Equatorial
Guinea was charged in Federal district court with the murder of his
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American administrative assistant within the confines of the United
States Embassy at Santa Isabel, Equatorial Guinea in violation of 18
U.S.C. § II l(b). The statute prohibits the crime of murder "[w]ithin
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
Read with 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) the jurisdiction includes "[a]ny lands re-
served or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof. . . ." Defendant moved to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.' Judge Oren Lewis of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied
the motion holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) a Federal district court
may exercise jurisdiction over an American diplomat charged with the
murder of another American diplomat on the premises of an American
embassy located in a foreign nation.'
It is clear that principles of international law form a part of the law
of the United States.' International law recognizes five basic principles
for the assertion of penal jurisdiction.' The best established of these
principles is the territorial principle under which the right to exercise
jurisdiction is determined by reference to the locus of the crime. Early
United States recognition of this principle came during a period per-
vaded by international jurisdictional issues when Chief Justice Marshall
declared that "the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute."5 All legislation is presumptively of
a territorial nature6 with the legality or illegality of an act being deter-
mined by the law of the country in which the act is done.7 The underlying
premise of this principle is found in the concept of sovereignty: "For
another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat
him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where
he did the acts . . . would be an interference with the authority of
'Defendant's additional motion to dismiss for lack of venue was denied. Venue was predicated
upon 18 U.S.C. § 3238 which grants venue to the court in the district "in which the offender...
is arrested or is first brought..."Erdos was arrested upon debarking from an airplane at Dulles
International Airport which is located within the Eastern District of Virginia. The significant issue
in this case, however, concerns jurisdiction rather than venue. Once it is determined that jurisdic-
tion exists it would probably follow that venue is proper. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S.
94 (1922); Haddad v. United States, 349 F. 2d 511 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 896 (1965).
2Erdos v. United States, criminal No. 414-71-A (E.D. Va., Jan. 27, 1972). [hereinafter cited as
Slip Opinion]. Erdos was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The
Washington Post, March 4, 1972, § B, at 1.
'The Paquete Habana, 174 U.S. 677 (1900).
'Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crimes, 29 A.J.I.L. 435, 445 (Supp.
1935).
5Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
"American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
7Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R. R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
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another sovereign." ' Because this territorial principle was so restrictive
the courts have developed new principles to expand jurisdiction in the
face of its rigid application.?
Under the nationality principle, jurisdiction is predicated upon the
citizenship of the offender rather than the locus of the crime.'" By virtue
of this principle United States courts have asserted jurisdiction to hold
an American citizen subject to the laws of the United States wherever
he may be."
Under the protective principle, jurisdiction is determined by reference
to the national interest adversely affected by the offense. This principle,
also recognized by United States courts, justifies a state's punishment
of one who has caused a harmful act outside its jurisdiction if the
consequences of such act prove to have a detrimental effect upon the
national interest within the jurisdiction. 2
Under the passive nationality principle, jurisdiction is determined by
reference to the nationality of the victim of the offense. Although this
principle has been accepted by some nations, American courts have
opposed it.'3
Under the universality principle, jurisdiction is determined by refer-
ence to the authority which maintains the custody of the person who
committed the crime. This principle has been recognized in the United
States in the case of piracy where jurisdiction is extended to the high
'American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
'See Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MICH. L. REV. 238 (1931).
"
0See United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dictum).
"Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 521
(1932); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
"
2Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); Rocha v. United States, 288 F. 2d 545 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal.
1960). But see Chin Bick Wah v. United States, 245 F. 2d 274 (9th Cir. 1957). The protective
principle was recognized by the Permanent Court of International Justice in Case of the S.S. Lotus,
[1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A., No. 9. The Court held that Turkey had jurisdiction to try a French ship
captain for causing the deaths of Turkish Nationals in a collision with a Turkish vessel in interna-
tional waters.
The French codification of this principle is as follows:
Any foreigner who, outside the territory of France shall be culpable, either as principal
or accomplice of a crime against the security of the state . . . shall be prosecuted and
tried according to the provisions of French laws, if he is arrested in France or if the
government obtains extradition. CODE D' INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE art. 7(l) (48 ed.
Petits Codes Dalloy 1948).
'"Jurisdiction asserted upon the principle of passive personality without qualifications has been
more strongly contested than any other type of competence. It has been vigorously opposed in
Anglo-American countries." Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crimes,
supra note 4, at 578-80.
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seas."4 Some authorities have added a sixth principle, the floating terri-
tory principle. Under this principle special jurisdiction over vessels ex-
ists'5 through the application of the rule of international maritime law
that the state whose flag the vessel flies is competent to exercise jurisdic-
tion over such vessel. 6
In the Erdos decision, the court expressly relied on the protective and
nationality principles as the bases for the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Explaining its application of the protective principle the court stated:
That principle. . .with respect to the enforcement of criminal laws,
provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attach-
ing legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threatens
its security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions,
provided the conduct is generally recognized as a crime under the law
of states that have reasonably developed legal systems. 7
The court found a threat to the operation of governmental functions
in that "[t]he alleged murder here clearly interfered with the foreign
affairs of the United States and its diplomatic relations with Equatorial
Guinea"'I and further that "the United States Embassy at Santa Isabel
ceased functioning for a substantial period of time" as a direct result
of the incident. 9
Using the nationality principle as further support the court stated that
"there is also considerable authority that this court could assume juris-
diction" under this principle.20 The court relied on Skiriotes v. Florida
in which the Supreme Court stated that the United States may govern
the conduct of its citizens in foreign countries when the rights of other
nations or their nationals are not infringed.2'
As the Erdos court notes, a United States district court may exercise
jurisdiction on the basis of either the protective or the nationality princi-
ple. It may not exercise such jurisdiction, however, in the absence of an
expression of congressional authorization since the judicial power of the
United States is limited and extends only as far as has been explicitly
"United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412 (1820).
"George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 609, 613 (1966).
"See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-86 (1953).
"
7Slip Opinion, supra note 2, at 2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 33 (1965).
'"Slip Opinion, supra note 2, at 2-3.
'lid. at 3.
mid.
"Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941) (sustained criminal conviction for a violation
occurring in excess of three miles off the Florida coast.)
19731
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
provided by congressional legislation.2 It follows, therefore, that a man
cannot be tried for a crime in a Federal court unless he has violated a
Federal statute.3
The traditional rule of extraterritorial applicability of legislation
which obtains in the United States is that the statutory law applies only
to conduct occurring within the territory of the United States unless a
contrary intent is clearly indicated by the statute. 24 Thus, although Con-
gress may enact statutes with extraterritorial effect, 25 if punishment of
crimes "is to be extended to include those committed outside of the
strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the
statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this
regard. 12 Strict adherence to this rule is required in construing criminal
statutes because as Chief Justice Marshall declared, "the rule that penal
laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than
construction itself.' 21
The Erdos court found the requisite expression of legislative intent
that jurisdiction be exercised extraterritorially under the protective and
nationality principles by reading 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) together with 18
U.S.C. § 1 11 (b).2 8 18 U.S.C. § 1 111 (b) subjects to punishment anyone
committing murder "within the special maritime and territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States." The court held that "the American Embassy
at Santa Isabel, Equatorial Guinea, is on lands reserved or acquired for
the use of the United States' 29 within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 7(3)
which defines "the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States" as:
Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and
under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place
purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of
12Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245
(1845).
'Brooks v. Texas, 256 F. Supp. 807, 811 (N.D. Tex. 1966).21See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 33
(1965). See also J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 299 (6th ed. Waldock 1963).
2 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-38 (1932) (failure of American citizen to return
from abroad to testify in federal court held contempt of court); United States v. Bowman, 260
U.S. 94 (1922) (defrauding United States while on high seas and in a foreign country); Rocha v.
United States, 288 F. 2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 366 U.S. 948 (1961) (sham marriages entered
into abroad for purposes of defrauding the United States).
2 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281
(1949).
27United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
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the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection
of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.
The authorization for 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) is found in Article I, Section
8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution, which provides that
Congress shall have the power,
to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such dis-
trict (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular
states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the govern-
ment of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places
purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the
same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-
yards, and other needful buildings.
The Framers intended that the first portion of this constitutional
provision vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Government over the
place to be selected as its seat of government.30 The remaining portion
of the provision was designed to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal
Government over places acqjuired from the individual states for the
purpose of erecting structures for use by the Federal Government."
The 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) provision was originally § 3 of the Crimes Act
of 179032 which prohibited murder "within any fort, arsenal, dockyard,
magazine, or in any other place or district of country, under the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." The present form of the
statute with the exclusion of the words "or concurrent" first appeared
in the Criminal Code of 1909. 3 The insertion of the clause "on any
land reserved or acquired for the use of the United States," did not
extend the original scope of jurisdiction. The purpose of this clause was
to codify into one statute various jurisdictional sections which pre-
viously appeared in several sections. Senator Heyburn, a sponsor of the
bill, stated that the statute was not intended to expand the jurisdiction
of United States courts:
[W]e have not attempted to enlarge the jurisdiction of the United
States either technically or geographically. We have simply gathered
up a large number of existing provisions in the various statutes, the
enumeration of the places over which the United States courts should
have jurisdiction for the punishment of these offenses-we have gath-
I THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison).
"Id. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 117, 127, 321, 325, 505, 506, 510, 570,
609, 656 (M. Farrand ed. 1966); 3 Id. at 122. 408.
2Act of April 30, 1970, ch. 9, § 3, 1 Stat. 113.
"Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 272, 35 Stat. 1143.
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ered them together in a section at the beginning of this chapter provid-
ing for the punishment of these particular offenses in order to avoid
the repetition with each separate section of this geographical jurisdic-
tion ."
In 1940, 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) was amended to include the phrase "under
the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United States. 3 5 The
purpose of this amendment was to confer concurrent jurisdiction upon
the courts over crimes committed on Federal reservations where the
Government exercised partial jurisdiction. 6 In 1948 the final revision
was made and the term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction"
was substituted for "the crimes and offenses defined in [the 1940
Act.]"37 The Revisor's Note to this revision states that despite minor
changes "the extent of the special jurisdiction as originally enacted has
been carefully followed." Thus, the legislative history of 18 U.S.C.
§ 7(3) reveals that Congress did not intend the exercise of jurisdiction
authorized by the statute to infringe upon the jurisdiction of other sover-
eign nations. No court decision has ever given the statute this broad
reading. As a matter of fact, a number of apposite judicial decisions
buttress the conclusion that the intent of Congress was to limit its
exercise to areas within the territorial sovereignty of the United States.
In United States v. Wiltberger5 Chief Justice Marshall construed
the former version of 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) which extends criminal jurisdic-
tion to the "high seas. ' ' 9 He refused to find that the jurisdiction in-
tended by the words "high seas" extended to a manslaughter committed
on an American vessel in Chinese territory. Declining to fashion a judi-
cial sanction of the exercise of jurisdiction in the absence of proper
legislation, the Chief Justice stated:
[T]he power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not the judicial
department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a
crime, and ordain its punishment."
1142 CONG. REC. 1186 (1908) (Remarks of Senator Heyburn).
"Act of June II, 1940, ch. 323, 54 Stat. 304 (as amending Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 272,
35 Stat. 1143).
3
'Congress authorized federal agencies and officers in charge of land to obtain consent to either
exclusive or partial jurisdiction over any land deemed desirable. Act of October 9, 1940, ch. 793,
§ 355, 54 Stat. 1083. The revised version of 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) would thus conform to congressional
design to afford government agencies broad discretion in obtaining the necessary jurisdiction.
"
7Act of June 11, 1940, ch. 323, 54 Stat. 304.
1118 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
"Act of April 30, 1790, ch, 9, § 12, 1 Stat. 115.
'"United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820). A related question arose in
United States v. Escamilla, 467 F. 2d 341 (4th Cir. 1972). Escamilla was tried and convicted under
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In United States v. Cordova4 the court refused to find that the words
"high seas" authorized the exercise of jurisdiction over an individual
who assaulted another aboard an American airplane flying over the high
seas. The court stated:
The proper approach is ...to be gathered ...from United States
v. Wiltberger ...The acts for which Cordova stands charged were
vicious in the extreme. He jeopardized others on the plane, including
a considerable number of infants. But it seems to me clear that those
acts have not been denounced by a statute which forbids them when
committed on board an American "vessel", or when committed on the
"high seas."42
In response to the Cordova decision Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 7(5)
to "plug that gap in the criminal law"43 by extending Federal jurisdic-
tion to crimes committed on an American airplane in flight over the
high seas. Congress apparently had previously recognized the limited
jurisdictional scope of § 7 of Title 18 when, in 1856, it enacted 18
U.S.C. § 7(4) to extend Federal jurisdiction to the Guano Islands."
Apart from those judicial decisions and congressional enactments
additional evidence exists which points to the limited jurisdictional
scope of the statute in question. In an 1848 opinion, the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States stated that the courts of the United States
lacked the proper authority to try a captain of a Georgian infantry
battalion who was charged with the murder of another American offi-
cer. This was true even though the incident took place on Mexican
territory which was occupied by American troops and under the author-
ity of a military governor. 5 The Attorney General was of the opinion
that since the offense was not committed in any of the locations enumer-
ated in the Crimes Act of 1790, there was no express legislative provi-
18 U.S.C. § 1112 for involuntary manslaughter allegedly committed while on an unclaimed island
of ice floating in the Arctic Ocean. Although the conviction was reversed and the case remanded
on the substantive allegations, the evenly-divided court was unable to determine whether jurisdic-
tion had been exercised properly under 18 U.S.C. § 7(l) which extends criminal jurisdiction to the
"high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
189 F. Supp. 298 (1950).
111d. at 303.
11H.R. REP. No. 2257, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952).
"Act of Aug. 18, 1956, ch. 164, I1 Stat. 119. See Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., Ist Sess. 1697 (1856).
See also Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890), where defendant's conviction pursuant to 18
U.S.C § 7(4) was affirmed. The court indicated id. at 211, however, that but for the presence of
express legislation covering the specific location involved, it would have been improper to exercise
jurisdiction.
455 OP. AT-r'Y GEN. 55 (1848).
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sion sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the offense." In 1970 the
House Committee on Armed Forces published a report of the Armed
Services Investigating Sub-committee inquiry into the My Lai episode.
This report recognized that the former servicemen involved in the inci-
dent could not be brought to trial because no court had jurisdiction over
them ."
The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws has
given special attention to the jurisdictional gaps in 18 U.S.C. § 7(3).
The Commission has proposed the enactment of a provision entitled
"Extraterritorial Jurisdiction," 4 which provides, inter alia:
Except as otherwise expressly provided, extraterritorial jurisdiction
over an offense exists when the offense is committed by a federal public
servant who is outside the territory of the United States because of his
official duties or by a member of his household residing abroad or by
a person accompanying the military forces of the United States.
The Commission's comment states that "when the crime involves only
Americans, the host nation may be reluctant to take action against the
perpetrator . . .This paragraph also closes a gap in jurisdiction with
regard to diplomatic personnel who have immunity in the host country
and yet cannot be prosecuted in the United States for acts abroad. '50
Citing a specific example in its analysis of the proposed section, the
Commission stated that present Federal law does not cover the murder
of an American ambassador by his wife or a member of his staff, an
area which will be covered by "the proposed redefinition of federal
extraterritorial jurisdiction."'"
In the Erdos decision, however, Judge Lewis asserted jurisdiction
citing the Supreme Court in Skiriotes v. Florida:2
the United States is not debarred by any rule of international law
from governing the conduct of its own citizens. . . in foreign countries
... .with respect to such an authority there is no question of inter-
national law, but solely of the purport of the municipal law . . .5
461d.
4 7INVESTIGATING SUBCOMM. OF HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED FORCES, 92st Cong., 2d Sess.,
REPORT ON THE MYLAI INCIDENT 47-48 (Comm. Print 1970).
" NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 208 at 18 (1970).
'ld. § 208(0 at 19.
'l0 d. § 208 Comment at 19-20.
"Id. at xxxi.
52313 U.S. 69 (1941).
"aSlip Opinion, supra note 2, at 4.
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Judge Lewis found 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) as the "municipal law" governing
the crime in Erdos, a construction requiring a clear expression of legisla-
tive intent that the statute be applied extraterritorially. It is submitted
that 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) is not an expression of such intent and that an
analytical examination of the statute reveals a contrary intent.
Implicit in the court's opinion is the recognition that Congress per-
haps did not intend that 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) be applied extraterritorially.
This implicit recognition appears to stem from the court's finding of an
alternative ground for the exercise of its jurisdiction. Quoting from
Wilson's Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities,54 the court stated:
[D]iplomats do not escape the jurisdiction of the courts of their home
state. It would appear as if they remain domiciled on the territory of
the sending state in matters of civil and criminal jurisdiction."
The court also found that "the United States Embassy . . . is a part of
the territory of the United States," 6 in effect finding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 7(3) does not have to be applied extraterritorially since the American
Embassy premises are part of the territory of the United States. The
court here employed a proposition known as the theory of exterritori-
ality.5 7 Under this theory, first proposed by Grotius,58 diplomatic prem-
ises are regarded as foreign soil in the host nation and an extension of
the territory of the sending state, although physically a part of the host
nation. 9 The theory of exterritoriality is a legal fiction unsupported by
modern international law.6 0 It has been stated that "such a theory may
for certain purposes be useful, but it is untrue; in fact, it leads to absurd
results and it has now been definitely repudiated by the more modern
writers and by decisions of the courts."'" The Erdos court revived the
anachronistic doctrine of exterritoriality even though it has been re-
jected by American courts.6 In an action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, which is not applicable to claims arising in a foreign country, the
plaintiff contended that his claim did not arise in a foreign country
because the significant acts occurred within the confines of the Ameri-
"C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES (1967).
"Id. at 32.
"Slip Opinion, supra note 2, at 3.
117 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 33 at 353 (1970).
'C. WILSON, supra note 54, at 17.
"Id. at 6.
"7. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 57, at 353.
11C. HURST, Juridical Basis of Diplomatic Immunities, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE COL-
LECTED PAPERS OF SIR CECIL HURST 195, 199 (1950).
"But cf United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708, 709 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
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can Embassy at Bangkok, Thailand. 3 The court rejected this conten-
tion stating that embassies abroad are not part of the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States. 4 In another case, the defendants, prosecuted
for petty larceny committed at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, 5
moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the embassy was
Soviet territory and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the United
States. The court concluded that for the purpose of arresting individuals
for crimes committed on the premises of the embassy it was a part of
the United States.66
Although a number of foreign courts have applied the principle of
exterritoriality,67 most have rejected this theory. 8 It is accepted that
criminal acts done within diplomatic premises are acts done within the
territory of the host nation, and that consequently the host nation has
exclusive jurisdiction over the offender. 9 If the offender is a diplomat
he may be entitled to diplomatic immunity from judicial process of the
host nation;76 once this immunity is waived by the sending state the
applicable local law becomes operative.7' The rationale for the diplo-
matic immunity doctrine is that harmonious relations between states is
promoted by the avoidance of interference with foreign legations.72 Al-
though the effects of exterritoriality and diplomatic immunity may coin-
cide they are basically different and should not be confused. Further-
more, the former has been repudiated while the latter continues to be
"Meredith v. United States, 330 F. 2d 9 (9th Cir. 1964).
"Id. at II.
"United States v. Moore, Criminal No. 2363-68 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess.1968); United States v.
Harmon, Criminal No. 2364-68 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1968).
66Id.
67See, e.g., In re Zoltan Sz., [1928] 22 BONTETOJOGI D6NTVEYTAR No. 4, 4 Int'l L. Rep. 372
(Sup. Ct. Hung. 1928). Here the defendant fraudulently induced the Hungarian Legation in Vienna
to issue a passport to him. In ruling on the issue as to the location of the offense, the court stated:
[T]he offense was committed not abroad but on the territory of the Hungarian state.
The premises of the Royal Hungarian Legation which enjoyed the privileges of extrater-
ritoriality must be regarded as Hungarian territory. Accordingly, all acts committed
therein must be judged according to the rules of Hungarian criminal law. Id. at 373.
"See. e.g., Judgement of April 30, 1954, [1955] e Pasicrisie Beige 112, 21 Int'l L. Rep. 249 (Belg.
1954). Belgian law provided for reparations for damage caused by war on Belgian territory. The
premises of the Belgian Embassy in Berlin were held not to be Belgian territory.
"See Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968), where the court held that the
Republic of Korea had exclusive jurisdiction over a U.S. serviceman charged with committing
murder in Korea.
'"Arcaya v. Paez, 145 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See M. OGDON, JUDICIAL BASES OF
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY (1936); 25 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329.
I'M. HARDY, MODERN DIPLOMATIC LAW 63-64 (1968).
'2See e.g., Ghosh v. D'Rozario, [19621 2 All E.R. 640, 644 (C.A.).
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viable.73 Exterritoriality should also not be confused with inviolability.
Embassy premises are inviolable, that is, they cannot be entered,
searched, or detained by the local authorities, even under process of
law.74 On the other hand, "the inviolability of diplomatic premises does
not mean that they are to be considered altogether outside the applica-
tion of the law of the receiving state-a foreign enclave within its terri-
tory. .... 1
In reviving exterritoriality the Erdos court, as previously stated,
quoted Wilson's Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities. It is submitted
that the court's quotation from Wilson is out of context. Wilson states
that it would appear that diplomats remained domiciled on the territory
of the sending state only because the doctrine of diplomatic immunity
provides them with jurisdictional immunity." The court fails to note
that Wilson continues:
The fiction of exterritoriality has been discredited and nationality nor-
mally would be considered as the legal basis for jurisdiction by the
sending state.7"
But as we have seen, Congress has not yet enacted extraterritorial legis-
lation under the nationality principle to cover crimes on diplomatic
premises.
Finally the Erdos court relies on Article 3(4) of the Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations79 which states:
The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiv-
ing state does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending
state.
This principle is well accepted but, again, Congress has not conferred
7
"Oppenheim favors the term "exterritoriality" because it demonstrates that the diplomat enjoy-
ing diplomatic immunity is treated as though he were not within the territory of the receiving state.
I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 711 (7th Lauterpacht ed. 1948).
Incorrect use of the term has created so much criticism that perhaps it should be abandoned
completely. See Preuss, Capacity for Legation and the Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic Immuni-
ties. 10 N.Y.U.L. REV. 170 (1932):
In the interest of accuracy of thought and expression, it is desirable that the word
"exterritoriality' be dropped from the language of international law. A term which is
susceptible of so many diverse connotations cannot serve the purposes of precise juristic
terminology. Id. at 187.
112 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED BY THE UNITED STATES 1271 (2d
ed. 1951).
75J. BRIERLY, supra note 24, at 260.
6See supra note 24, at 260.
"See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
7"C. WILSON, supra note 54, at 32.
79id.
1973]
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upon the Federal courts this category of jurisdiction. The court also
stated that "the defendant was not arrested in Equatorial Guinea-to
the contrary, he was allowed to leave that country."8 This fact did not
vest the court with jurisdiction:
[T]he foreign nation has the exclusive jurisdiction to punish the of-
fender . . . under international law the United States has no authority
to infringe upon the jurisdiction of a sovereign nation by dictating to
that nation the procedure to be followed by that nation in the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction over alleged violators of its criminal laws.,1
Congress alone possesses the authority to confer jurisdiction upon the
Federal courts by enacting extraterritorial legislation, premised on the
protective and the nationality principles to prohibit crimes by American
nationals in American embassies abroad. It has not yet done so and in
the absence of such legislation a court should not exercise improper
jurisdiction, upon the basis of a legislative intent which does not exist
and a tenuous legal theory, to punish a crime which has been left unpun-
ished due to imperfect legislation. Such a precedent might produce
ominous legal consequences. It is suggested that Congress adopt the
proposed legislation of the National Commission on Reform of the
Federal Criminal Code to extend jurisdiction to crimes committed by
American diplomats abroad. Moreover, in order to regulate the conduct
of American citizens abroad in the broadest possible manner so as to
avoid future gaps in the proposed statute, it is suggested that Congress
enact the following statute:
All offenses committed in a foreign nation or in any place outside the
territorial limits of the United States by an American citizen which
would be prohibited if committed within the United States shall be
subject to punishment as if committed in the United States if they have
not been tried elsewhere and if the accused is in the United States
voluntarily or as a result of extradition.
The far-reaching implications of the Erdos decision arise from the
exercise of jurisdiction by the court in the absence of a statute authoriz-
ing such jurisdiction. The court has given the United States Government
a mandate to apply a statute extraterritorially in the absence of an
expression of congressional intent that this be done.
"Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done 18 April 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 96, 112. The
United States deposited its accession at Jordan on July 29, 1971. 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 296 (Sept.
1971).
"lSlip Opinion supra note 2.
"
2Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968).
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